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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONSERVATIVE REACTION, c.1792-1820: THE CASE FOR REJECTION 
 
 
We defy the most learned chronologist, the most intelligent annalist, the most 
industrious antiquary, and the most diligent inquirer into the facts and records of 
past times, to produce from history, ancient or modern, any parallel for such 
situations. In truth, no such nation as the United States, all circumstances 
considered, has ever been discovered in the political hemisphere.1 
 
So the Anti-Jacobin Review summed up the enigma that the American republic continued to 
constitute for conservative observers in Britain in the early decades of its existence. In this 
particular instance, months before the outbreak of the Anglo-American War of 1812, the writer 
was both confounded and outraged that ‘a nation, insignificant in the scale of power, in the 
infancy almost of civilization, and with a circumscribed revenue, arising from sources over 
which she had not absolute controul’ should be ‘publicly discussing, in her legislative bodies, not 
only the propriety and necessity of war with a friendly state, but the means of carrying it on, and 
the objects to which it should be directed!’2 How to square the circle of presumed American 
incompetence with a rising anxiety regarding its potential was an unspoken (and perhaps 
unrecognised dilemma) for British conservative commentators during these decades. 
Conservative writers articulated a largely hostile attitude towards the United States of America 
between 1792 and 1820. They admitted that there were some reasons to admire the achievements 
of the new republic; and apprehension, which was also expressed, implies some form of respect. 
It proved to be much too soon yet, however,  for writers at this end of the British political 
spectrum to admit the reality of the establishment of a successful federal republic in place of 
their thirteen colonies, to ‘embrace closure’, and to accept that they had departed from the British 
empire without disintegrating into inter-state conflict, political collapse, economic ruin and loss 
of all international stature. They had been convinced that an American republic was not viable, 
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and they had fully expected the attempt to result in disaster. Their response to its realization and 
flourishing was a mixture of resentment, contempt and fear. Moreover, their stance on British 
political issues which emerged during these decades – parliamentary reform, defence of the 
British empire, and the question of free trade – also determined that their attitude towards 
America was unlikely to be appreciative. Indeed, for much of the time they were really 
discussing British politics through the prism of America. The American constitution, American 
party politics, American grievances concerning the British navigation laws, Canada, emigration 
to North America, and the Anglo-American relationship were all deeply interesting matters in 
themselves. But they also allowed conservative writers to expound scorn for representational 
politics involving a wide franchise and weak central government; suspicion of reformers; support 
for protectionist commercial policy, imperialism, conservation of traditional practices and 
values; pride in Britain’s place in the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic world; and dismissal of 
former colonists who believed that they could succeed as a nation apart from their mother 
country.3 
The writers who comprise the main witnesses to the conservative attitude towards the United 
States of America between 1792 and 1820 in this chapter are George Canning, John Wilson 
Croker, John Gifford, Sir John Barrow and, to a lesser extent, Arthur Young. They are 
supplemented liberally by some of the main conservative review periodicals of these decades, 
which carried substantial articles on American issues, and which Canning, Croker, Gifford and 
Barrow either wrote for or were instrumental in establishing or editing: the Anti-Jacobin (1797-
8) and the Anti-Jacobin Review, later the Anti-Jacobin Review and True Churchman’s Magazine 
(from 1798); the Quarterly Review (from 1809); and Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine (from 
1817). Of the writers discussed in Chapter Three, none continued to publish considerations of the 
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United States after 1791. Samuel Johnson died in 1784, and Josiah Tucker in 1799; Adam 
Ferguson lived until 1816 but, like Burke, he had moved his attention completely to the 
Revolution in France and the war in Europe in this period. Even his correspondence betrays no 
trace of a continuing curiosity about America. Knox concentrated on British North American 
territories till his death in 1810, acting as agent for New Brunswick from 1783 till 1808, and for 
Prince Edward Island from 1801 till 1807, though he continued to lobby government ministers 
with the view that the interests of British territories and their trade should not be sacrificed to the 
interests of American commerce.4 
John Gifford (1758-1818), historian of France, was the ‘arch-Tory editor and chief writer’ of the 
monthly Anti-Jacobin Review, the successor to the Anti-Jacobin; or, Weekly Examiner.5 Both, as 
their titles suggest, were established as prominent Church-and-King polemical weapons against 
the ideology and example of the Revolution in France. Gifford continued to edit and write many 
articles for the Anti-Jacobin Review, as well as for the Quarterly Review,  until his death in 1818. 
He held two consecutive police magistracies and a pension of £300 a year as a result of his 
services to government in his journalism and pamhleteering; though, as Emily Lorraine de 
Montluzin has written, it seems unlikely that the deep and viciously conservative political 
convictions apparent in his writing were produced simply by Treasury money.6 Arthur Young 
(1741-1820), an agricultural reformer and writer, was similarly primarily interested in the 
Revolution in France, which had transformed his liberal and reformist attitudes into counter-
revolutionary conservatism – indeed, he seemed to suggest that he had initially been more 
enthusiastic about the new American constitution until events in France made him think more 
cautiously.7 He wrote one of the most famous and influential British pamphlets of the 1790s 
propaganda war on the French Revolution, The Example of France a Warning to Britain (1793). 
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His agricultural concerns had led him not only to investigate France in the years leading up to the 
Revolution, but also to take an interest in America: he corresponded at some length with George 
Washington about farming in Pennsylvania and Virginia.8  
Canning (1770-1827), a protégé of the Younger Pitt and an MP from 1793, was Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs between 1796 and 1799, and Foreign Secretary between 1807 and 
1809, the latter in particular a period of rising tension between Britain and America over the 
maritime rights of neutral nations during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. He 
founded the Anti-Jacobin in 1797 to counter the liberal Monthly Magazine and ‘to set the mind 
of the people right upon every subject’. In 1809 he established the Quarterly Review with the 
novelist Walter Scott in direct opposition to the liberal Edinburgh Review.9 The Quarterly 
Review was an organ which consistently criticized the new American constitution and argued 
that Britain was too conciliatory towards America in the long-running dispute. Although 
Canning was a leading contributor to the short-lived Anti-Jacobin, he wrote very little himself 
for the Quarterly Review, and his own pronouncements on America were chiefly made to the 
House of Commons both during and after his tenure as Foreign Secretary.10  
John Wilson Croker (1780-1857) was Canning’s colleague both in Parliament and on the 
Quarterly Review. He entered Parliament in 1807, and held the post of Secretary to the 
Admiralty between 1809 and 1830, in which capacity he, like Canning, had much to say about 
American diplomacy. His Key to the Orders in Council (1812) was written at the request of the 
Prime Minister, Spencer Perceval, to explain government policy towards America, and published 
at the expense of the Treasury. Thousands of copies were said to have been sent to America as 
well as to British coastal towns.11 Although his other pamphlet on the War of 1812, a collection 
of letters he had published in the Courier under the pseudonym Nereus (the Greek god of the 
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sea), was written to defend the Admiralty against British charges of neglect and incompetence 
during the conflict, it none the less caused John Quincy Adams to describe him as ‘an inveterate 
and rancorous enemy to America’.12 Croker also wrote many articles for the Quarterly Review.  
Sir John Barrow (1764-1848), a civil servant also at the Admiralty, and a promoter of 
exploration (and author of Mutiny on the Bounty, 1831), was another prolific contributor to the 
Quarterly. Although he claimed in his Autobiography to have ‘avoided touching upon politics as 
much as possible, almost, I might say, altogether’ in his articles for the review, confining himself 
to the discussion of voyages, travels and inventions, in fact he was central to two lengthy and  
important articles on America which proposed at the start of the War of 1812 that a secret 
understanding existed between President Madison and Bonaparte, and, later, that Madison was 
playing France and Britain off against each other, as well as to some later articles discussing 
American commerce and society.13 
The Quarterly Review was by design not a party organ; although it had strong links with the 
government, it was independent. It was a political publication as much as it was a literary 
journal, however, and the views expressed in it emanated from a broadly conservative or Tory 
position. It supported the administrations which led Britain through the long wars against 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France as well as through the short war against America in 1812-
14, but it was more concerned to oppose liberalism than to defend the government.14 By 1818 its 
circulation was 13,000, and its readership far in excess of that.15 While Croker, Gifford and 
Barrow were regular contributors to the Quarterly, not all of its articles have yet had their 
authors identified, including some substantial and important papers on the United States.16 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, founded in 1817, was another partisan Tory periodical, 
which also aimed to weaken the influence of the Edinburgh Review, publishing both satirical and 
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reflective pieces by writers of such stature as Thomas De Quincey, James Hogg and J.G. 
Lockhart.17  
As Massimiliano Demata has suggested, discussing travel literature and works on foreign policy 
allowed the review periodicals to consider many of their interests at once – literature, culture, 
foreign policy and the place of Britain in the wider world.18 American affairs retained an 
irresistible fascination even for conservatives who would rather not have had to deal with them – 
the regular paragraphs on news from the United States published in Blackwood’s, for instance, 
were placed ahead of those on ‘British North America’, or Canada. The following discussion will 
consider in turn the writings and speeches of these conservative politicians and journalists on the 
subjects of the American Revolution in retrospect, the American political system, the 
international role of the United States, the War of 1812, the American economy and society, and 
the prospects for British emigrants to America. 
 
I The American Revolution  
Conservative periodical writers continued to nurse a resentment for the American Revolution in 
the decades following the ratification of the American constitution. The Anti-Jacobin Review 
was particularly unforgiving. While most British loyalists managed to produce largely positive 
obituaries when George Washington died, John Gifford wrote a venomous piece, denouncing 
him as a ‘traitor’, and the  Anti-Jacobin Review continued to disparage him for years to come. He 
was hypocritical regarding financial benefits; his military talents had been greatly over-rated; and 
the review was still describing him as a rebel and a traitor in 1814 – ‘for we shall ever call 
persons and things by their proper names’.19  
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Commenting unfavourably on American election politics in 1800, the Anti-Jacobin Review 
expressed the view that ‘the first fruit of their independence’ had been ‘decrepitude and 
disgrace’.20 A letter purporting to have been reprinted from the Montreal Courant in the Anti-
Jacobin Review in 1813 succinctly summarized the review’s opinion of the American 
Revolution. It had ‘originated in base ingratitude, founded upon a speculative apprehension of 
oppressions’, despite the complete absence of such tyranny by the British government. On the 
contrary, ‘the fostering care of the mother country, had been manifest in every step of the 
progress to maturity, of her unnatural children’, not least in rescuing the American colonists from 
the grasp of France in the Seven Years’ War, after which the colonists had ‘ungenerously refused 
to contribute one penny’. America had achieved independence only at the cost of the ‘sacrifice of 
[its] moral character’.  
Still worse were the wider consequences of the Revolution for which America was to be held 
responsible. It had turned out to be  
A Pandora’s box of evils, from which issued the accursed French Revolution, with 
all its horrid train of enormities, of fatal consequences, which has made Europe to 
bleed at ever[y] pore, and has now laid the continental part of it prostrate at the feet 
of the merciless usurper, dignified by the titles of emperor and king.21 
 
John Gifford, for instance, explained, in his history of the reign of Louis XVI and of the French 
Revolution, that the French entry into the War of Independence on the side of America had been 
significant, largely because of its financial consequences, but also because ‘the minds of men 
become attached to those principles which the causes they are embarked in require them to 
support’, and so the French nation had ‘naturally imbibed a love of freedom, nearly incompatible 
with royalty’. Gifford, however, was more nuanced than others in recognising also that some 
members of the French National Assembly had rejected American political principles as not 
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precisely suitable to French circumstances, and in showing that the French Revolution was 
ultimately derived from first principles rather than in imitation of the American example.22 By 
the time he came to write his Second Letter to the Hon. Thomas Erskine (1797), he was ready to 
be very critical of Erskine’s claim that ‘America and France began their revolutions upon the 
same principles’. According to Gifford, ‘An attentive perusal of the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Men, and the American Declaration of Independence, will suffice to demonstrate the 
inaccuracy of … your affirmation, by proving the two revolutions to have been founded on 
opposite principles’, i.e. ‘Retention’ in the American case and ‘Destruction’ in the French.23 In 
fact Gifford traced the political principles of the revolution in America in some measure back to 
the English Puritans of the seventeenth century, in any case.24 None of this, of course, disproved 
the notion that the French Revolution had been inspired by the broad example of liberation set by 
the Americans, and still less did it contradict the case that the financial crisis in France which had 
been partly responsible for the revolution had been aggravated by the part taken by France in the 
American War of Independence. 
The Anti-Jacobin Review was convinced that ‘The independency of America may, in all 
probability, be one of the greatest misfortunes that ever befel it’, leaving it economically isolated 
and politically at the mercy of faction, discord, anarchy and despotism; whereas, despite 
everything, Britain had benefited from the separation, being rid of ‘a nursery of discontent’ and 
freed to act more fully to pursue its own real interests.25 As Arthur Young put it, ‘a country may 
lose the monopoly of a distant empire, and rise from the imaginary loss more rich, more 
powerful, and more prosperous!’26 Yet the Quarterly Review noted – midway through the War of 
1812-14, when anti-American bitterness was reinforced – that the revolution in America had also 
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‘introduced a dangerous change of feeling in this country. It placed a portion of the English 
people in mental alliance with the enemies of England’.27  
 
II The American Political Model 
In 1817 Jeremy Bentham caricatured the British conservative reaction to the thriving United 
States of America: 
 
There they are – but happily with the Atlantic between us and them – the never-
sufficiently-accursed United States. There they are – living, and (oh horror!) 
flourishing – and so flourishing! flourishing under a reproach to legitimacy! Oh 
what a reproach, a never-to-be-expunged reproach, to our own Matchless 
Constitution – matchless in rotten boroughs and sinecures! Oh! had they but one 
neck – these miscreants!28   
 
The satire was exaggerated, but Bentham’s capture of conservative fear of the example of a 
successful republic in America was not far wide of the mark, more than three decades after 
independence had been ceded, and more than two decades after the outbreak of the Revolution in 
France, but at a time of continuing economic discontent and political restlessness at home, and of 
popular protest against illiberal governments in Europe.29 
Twenty-five years earlier, in the immediate aftermath of the eruption of the French Revolution, 
Mark Philp has argued, British loyalists had not quite known how to deal with the American 
model. It was impossible to ignore it after the publication of Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man, Part 
Two, in which Paine handled the increasing volatility and unpredictability of the French 
revolutionary model by paying more attention to America as an example to be emulated than to 
France. The loyalists’ strategy was to attack Paine ad hominem and to counter his arguments 
with various reasons why the American example was inapplicable to other governments in 
pamphlets published in 1792 and 1793; and then to ignore America in later discussions of the 
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French Revolution, as if to shut it out of the discussion, because it was not obvious how its 
example could be properly repudiated.30 Nevertheless, as David Wilson has written, it was vital 
for conservatives to overturn the image of America as a land of liberty and a model to be 
followed by the Old World.31 The conviction that British radicals and, indeed, the British public, 
required to have their illusions regarding America dispelled was frequently expressed by the 
Anti-Jacobin Review, which explained in 1799 that it wished  
to remove the film of prejudice from the eyes of thousands in this country, who 
have been accustomed to consider the United States as a model for all political 
institutions, as the asylum of liberty, and the last refuge of persecuted patriotism.32 
  
The suggestion that conservatives of the 1790s did not have complete confidence  in their own 
arguments against the American example, however, is perhaps supported by the fact that they 
sometimes admitted that its political character was not wholly objectionable.  Some even claimed 
that its constitution was edging closer to the British system. The presidency was taking on 
characteristics of monarchy, and the Senate those of aristocracy, a few years having proved that 
simple democracy was not perfect – developments that radicals were also concerned they could 
detect.33 Arthur Young contended that the American revolution had not, as Paine suggested, 
created its constitution experimentally from first principles: ‘for there is not now in the world a 
constitution so near the British as that of the United States’. Even its suffrage was limited by 
property qualifications, although the French Revolution had shown that the American 
constitution must be inferior to the British in its greater vulnerability to the monster of popular 
power.34 One of the regular contributors to the Anti-Jacobin Review was the Rev. Jonathan 
Boucher, a colourful British-born Loyalist in America during the Revolution. Despite his 
experiences of Patriot antagonism towards him in America, Boucher did acknowledge that the 
American Revolution had been more moderate than the French, expressed the hope that an 
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Anglo-American alliance against the revolutionary French might emerge, and even speculated 
that such a  coalition might lead to a federal union of some kind between Britain and America.35  
By 1810 the Quarterly Review admitted American peace and stability since its revolution, if 
(grudgingly) only by comparison with France, and for reasons not particularly to its own credit: 
It was, perhaps, natural to suppose that the spell which had worked such wonders 
was liberty ….  [But] It is, indeed, plain that the infant republic of America was 
nearly precluded from warlike exertion, by the combined effect of its weakness and 
of its remoteness from the great theatre of political contention.36 
 
The reviewer also referred to America’s vast and underpopulated territory to explain its internal 
stability, explaining that the almost unlimited opportunities for ‘enterprize and exertion’, offered 
by land to be cleared and cultivated, acted as  
so many sluices to draw off that superfluous humour, that disposable unquietness, 
if it may be so called, which had been excited by war, and would not subside with 
peace. Here, all the adventurous, the busy, and the troubled spirits, found either a 
resting-place, or a safe range. … Thus a part of the community, which, under other 
circumstances, would have been most noxious to the rest, was rendered not only 
harmless but useful.37 
 
America, in other words, was exceptional, and the precedent claimed on its behalf by radicals 
was ‘misapplied’.38 In any case, the American experiment was yet too young to be judged 
properly. ‘We have no convictions, no proof, it is in the womb of time – THE EXPERIMENT IS 
NOT YET MADE’, warned Arthur Young in 1793. Nearly thirty years later,  the Anti-Jacobin 
Review still thought that ‘the republican system of America, which has not experienced the trials 
of half a century, and was almost destroyed by a little piratical war of a couple of years’ duration, 
scarcely afforded means of forming a proper judgement’.39 
This approach was favoured by more moderate loyalists who acknowledged that the United 
States had not quite sunk into anarchy, chaos and ruin since obtaining its independence, and who 
therefore wished to explain that its circumstances were quite different from those of Britain and 
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other European countries, who could not and should not try to copy its model. The enormous 
tracts of land still available in America presented not only occupation to the restless, but also 
opportunity to the ambitious, and the possibility of greater economic equality than could be 
offered in the Old World. It was this resource, and the progress of commerce, not its political 
constitution, which gave America its character of liberty; and it was trade with America, not the 
American example of republican government, which was of consequence for Europe.40  
By far the most common conservative response to the American republican constitution, 
however, was trenchant criticism – and indeed, Troy Bickham suggests that, by 1812, 
conservatives were comfortable in using the American Republic as a better cautionary tale than 
the French, because of the cultural heritage and similarities shared by Britain and America.41 
Substantial analysis of the constitution was rare, perhaps reflecting the difficulty conservatives 
found in dealing with the American example. It was much more common for them to point out 
disadvantages which they claimed had resulted from the representative system. The most 
damaging aspect of republicanism, in their view, was that it awarded too much power and 
influence to the people and too little to the executive government. Such popular liberty as it 
created was better termed ‘licentiousness, bordering upon brutality’, and it was unquestionably 
worse than ‘the occasional abuse of magisterial power in a monarchical government’. With so 
little formal power to support them, administrations were likely to resort to using the mob to 
enforce their wills, according to the Quarterly Review, which suggested that President James 
Madison was doing exactly that on the outbreak of war in 1812.42 
His policy is represented as … vibrating to the feelings and the sentiments of a set 
of adventurers in the seaport towns, men without character and without a country; 
as appealing to the opinion of the mob, and the bending to that opinion. – In one 
word, America is said to be, at this moment, as much swayed by the clamorous 
rabble and the democratic clubs of the seaport towns, as the Directory of France 
was in the very worst periods of the Revolution.43   
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The lack of power and reward for government service in the American republican system 
resulted in men of inferior quality offering themselves as delegates and standing for office. The 
House of Representatives was mainly composed of lawyers, according to the Quarterly, who 
spent most of their time in the House studying their briefs rather than government policy; but at 
least they were orderly. ‘At times, nevertheless, the harmony of the house is interrupted by some 
turbulent Irishman, or some back-settler whom a keg of brandy may have sent to Congress, 
which in these wild and almost desolate regions is an irresistible canvasser’. The caucus system 
of elections was believed to be corrupt, and it made a mockery of the American claim to popular 
representation and universal manhood suffrage. It was ‘a great fallacy, and a complete fraud on 
the people … the Turkish constitution which calls a leader to his post by acclamation, may just 
as well be called a popular representation’.44 
Representative government also produced abusive factionalism, according to conservatives. ‘The 
Americans … are for ever cavilling at some of the public measures; something or other is always 
wrong, and they never appear perfectly satisfied. … Party spirit is for ever creating dissentions 
among them’, stated the Rev. Samuel Henshall in the Anti-Jacobin Review in 1799. He accused 
the American public of crude, dogmatic political opinions, ‘borrowed from newspapers, which 
are wretchedly compiled from the pamphlets of the day’. ‘The canvassing preparative to the 
election of president (which will take place in October next)’, reported John Gifford in August 
1800, ‘is conducted with that rancour and indecency, which are peculiar to American politics’.45 
Moreover, suggested the Quarterly in 1814, the federal structure of the United States was almost 
designed to produce division, and might even lead to the dissolution of the Union in time.46  
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American republicanism was also flawed by a corrupt system of justice. The Quarterly Review 
claimed that, because the judges were elected by the President and the Senate, and because they 
were not salaried, but received ‘only an uncertain “compensation, at stated periods, for their 
services”’, they became ‘the creatures of the president and senate’. Moreover, the lesser courts 
were entirely swayed by party politics and the allegiance of the presiding magistrate. ‘The 
justices of the peace are not, as with us, respectable country gentlemen. No such character, in 
fact, is known in America.’ In republican America, the review claimed, it was unnecessary for 
judges – or attorneys, doctors or preachers – to have had any training or qualification to practise. 
As a consequence of all these factors, it was not uncommon for the American people to take the 
law into their own hands.47  
The conservative reviewers also pointed out the rivalry and strife they noticed between northern 
and southern American states, ‘between whom some luxuriant seeds of jealousy and 
irreconcileable enmity were deeply sown, even before they united’. In 1798 the Anti-Jacobin 
Review expressed astonishment that the Union had lasted as long as it had.48 Both reviews 
favoured the inhabitants of the New England states, whom they considered to be the most like 
Europeans in their sentiments and manners, characterising them as ‘active and enterprising’, over 
their ‘luxurious and indolent’ southern neighbours.49 It helped, of course, that the northern states 
generally preferred a policy of restraint towards Britain in the years before the War of 1812-14, 
while the southern states favoured France. Indeed, the Anti-Jacobin Review suggested that the 
internal division was a root cause of the war of 1812-14, and that otherwise it would probably 
have resulted in an American civil war by 1812. The northern and eastern states had profited 
disproportionately from the long European war, which caused great jealousy in the southern and 
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inland states, whose inhabitants predicted the rise of undue northern political influence in the 
Union as a result.50 
 
III The International Role of the United States 
Conservatives, then, were very clear in their advice that Britain had nothing to gain by adopting 
American constitutional principles. Canning cited the example of America as well as that of 
France to illustrate ‘the effects of any attempt at the practical application of theoretic notions of 
democratic reform’.51 These conservative writers and reviews generally also expressed disdain 
for the quality and weight of the American republic in the scale of nations. It was, the Quarterly 
Review maintained in 1809, rather less powerful than either it or its British friends imagined, and 
John Barrow later reported gleefully that Americans were viewed only as ‘second-chop 
Englishmen’ in China, partly because (he alleged) they lacked commercial integrity, and partly 
because they allowed the Chinese to sell them poor quality tea leaves.52  Nevertheless, 
conservative commentators devoted significant space to criticising American ‘francophilia’ and 
explaining that it was, by contrast, in the interests of both the United States and Britain to 
cultivate a good relationship, which suggests that beneath the contempt they expressed lay a 
degree of fear of the growth of American power on the international stage.  
Most British conservative commentators thought of the Americans as ‘Jacobinical’ during the 
1790s, including, reportedly, the Prime Minister, William Pitt.53 Gifford believed that the French 
action on behalf of America during the War of Independence had had the effect of securing ‘a 
grateful and potent ally’ to France.54 In May 1798, as hostilities threatened between the United 
States and France (which it chronicled with pleasure), the Anti-Jacobin, or Weekly Examiner 
expressed great anxiety that the Adams administration would be tempted to pursue negotiations 
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with France because of public sympathy for the French republic.55 It was after the election of 
‘Citizen’ Thomas Jefferson, however, ‘that stout republican and stern philosopher of the new 
school’, as the third president of the United States in November 1800, that American 
‘francophilia’ was thought to have taken off in earnest. As the Anti-Jacobin Review put it in 
September 1805, ‘When a people are so degenerate as to chuse for their governor an Atheist and 
a Jacobin, they certainly deserve every calamity which can befal [sic] them’.56 Jefferson, the 
Quarterly Review claimed, was infected by the ‘incurable malady’ or ‘real jacobinism’, 
manifested in ‘a spirit of hatred against England. He ha[d] invited and encouraged her most 
inveterate enemies to settle in America’, such as Thomas Paine (‘this loathsome and 
blasphemous outcast’) and the Irish revolutionary, Robert Emmet.57  
According to these British conservative commentators, however, it was in American interests to 
nourish its friendship with Great Britain rather than pandering to French policies. The Quarterly, 
for instance, was convinced that ‘in America, whatever is civilized, whatever is intellectual, 
whatever is ennobling, whatever is good or great is, and must ever be, of English origin’. The 
flourishing of America was founded in the English constitution and laws.58 American 
commercial prosperity, such as it was, should also be credited to Britain because of the volume 
of Anglo-American trade and because of various British concessions and relaxations of its 
navigation laws in America’s favour.59 But interest in the relationship was not all one-sided. The 
Anti-Jacobin Review, belying its often-expressed disdain for America and disgust at its alleged 
francophilia, wrote in August 1799 that the United States and Britain were as ‘firmly attached to 
each other as we could wish the two countries once more to be, in affection as well as in 
interest’.60 Ten years later, it was severely critical of British ministers for failing to put sufficient 
effort and resources into seeking a rapprochement with the United States. Similarly, even on the 
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point of the outbreak of war against the United States in 1812, when most of its American 
content was concerned to condemn American belligerence, the Quarterly Review was also 
convinced that Britain itself ought to maintain and pursue the transatlantic friendship. This was 
because the interests of Britain and the United States were ‘intimately blended with each other’ 
and also, crucially, because America was the state most likely after Britain to oppose Napoleonic 
France. ‘The people of this country being derived from the same stock, speaking the same 
language, breathing the same spirit of liberty, have qualities quite sufficient to rivet 
[Bonaparte’s] hatred.’61  
The long conflict against revolutionary and Napoleonic France was the major determinant of 
British official and conservative attitudes towards America while it continued, and it explains 
conservative interest in a strong Anglo-American relationship, although the context of 
substantially increasing Anglo-American trade since 1783 should not be forgotten. As John 
Ehrman has pointed out, ‘For the first time in a European war there was a legally independent 
United States’, and it was vital to ensure that it did not aid and abet France, whether by supplying 
the French or by some more substantial movement away from neutrality. An Order in Council 
was passed within months of the outbreak of war in 1793, regulating the rights of neutral nations 
in maritime commerce during the war.62 Here it is necessary to set out some of the diplomatic 
background between the three nations during these decades in order to understand this aspect of 
British conservative (and, in the next chapter, liberal) attitudes towards the United States.   
Peter Marshall has argued that British colonial policy in the eighteenth century was almost 
wholly driven by the need to finance defence, particularly against France, and by the ambition to 
build international standing and power, again largely in competition with France.63  He has also 
shown that many British government ministers and politicians became much less interested in 
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the United States after American independence.64 It might then be asked whether Britain 
continued to cultivate its ties with America to the extent that it did, post-independence, primarily 
for the purpose of surpassing France.  On the other hand, earlier historians of the Anglo-
American relationship on both sides of the Atlantic, such as Robert Mowat and Charles 
Ritcheson, perhaps conscious of the twentieth-century importance of the connection, emphasized 
its value over time since 1783, maintaining that a firm friendship between Great Britain and the 
United States was part of ‘the natural order of things’ which statesmen of both nations 
recognized as valuable in its own right, and in which the War of 1812 was merely an 
‘anomaly’.65  In fact it is possible to see both evidence of a strengthening Anglo-American 
relationship in the early years of the nineteenth century and proof that Britain would, 
nonetheless, lay this association down if necessary to fortify its hand against France.   
Certainly, in the two decades before the outbreak of the Napoleonic war in 1803, British policy 
towards America had been marked by neglect except when really necessary. Although John 
Adams represented the United States in London from 1785, Britain did not bother to send a 
minister to Philadelphia (the American seat of government until 1800) until George Hammond 
was assigned to the post in 1791, because of the threat of increased American protectionism. 
Both Adams and his successor, Governeur Morris, tried to negotiate a commericial treaty with 
the British government, but the attempt was unsuccessful until John Jay arrived in July 1794 with 
the sole purpose of averting imminent war by securing a commercial agreement.  An American 
trade embargo had already been in place for two months by the time he arrived.  Such a pitch had 
been reached by Britain’s failure to evacuate forts in the north-west of the United States where 
there were fur-trading posts, contrary to the 1783 treaty of peace, and by its refusal to allow the 
United States to trade with the British West Indian islands, now that America was no longer part 
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of the British empire. American debts to British merchants and loyalists still remained unpaid, as 
did American claims for compensation for slaves removed by the British during the War of 
Independence.66 
British hostilities against France from 1793 introduced further issues. Anxious to restrict Franco-
American trade and to keep their own navy supplied with manpower, under ‘the Rule of 1756’ 
the British impeded neutral American shipping which they suspected might be trading with 
France, and pressed significant numbers of seamen in the employment of American merchant 
ships who were assumed to be deserters from the British navy.67  Several concessions were 
offered on both sides by the Jay Treaty of 1794. Permission was granted for smaller American 
ships to trade with the British West and East Indies; while free trade was established within the 
American continent, giving Britain most favoured nation status with the United States, and 
various items such as munitions, arms and shipbuilding materials were declared contraband for 
the duration of the Anglo-French war and not to be carried by neutral shipping.  The treaty was 
not well received in America because it was thought to concede too much to Britain. It was, 
however, almost wholly ratified by Congress, and hostilities were probably averted more by 
American efforts than by British, although Robert Liston, the British minister in Philadelphia 
from 1796-1800, did accrue credit for Britain by organising the withdrawal of the British from 
the north-west trading posts. The Washington and Adams presidencies, despite British 
conservative disparagement, were pacific and pro-British in sympathy.68 
In fact the French also deserve credit for the avoidance of an Anglo-American war in these years, 
because they did nothing to endear themselves to the American government.  The National 
Convention’s minister in America in 1793, Edmond Charles Genêt, caused so much affront to a 
government perhaps less radical than he had expected, that President Washington requested his 
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recall.69 Moreover, just as the British were endeavouring to restrict American trade with France, 
so France also tried to curb American trade with Britain, if not necessarily so effectively. Formal 
conflict was eventually averted by the accession to power of Napoleon in 1799, who was anxious 
to avoid hostilities with America, and by the election of the Francophile Republican, Thomas 
Jefferson, to the American presidency in 1800.70 In fact, Jefferson himself was more inclined to 
favour whichever of the two European nations had more to offer his own political objectives (in 
particular, the acquisition of New Orleans, Louisiana and Florida), but British conservatives 
outside government circles gave him little credit for this open-mindedness, while those inside 
government circles were unable to escape the need to retain British maritime dominance and 
refused to back down over the rights of neutral shipping. Sailors were increasingly desperately 
needed by the British navy as the war progressed, and, as The Times  put it in 1807,  
[W]ar has nothing terrible in it, when compared to the surrender of our maritime 
rights.  We would recommend peace and conciliation with the Americans, but it 
must be such a peace as leaves us in the free and undisputed possession of all the 
advantages resulting from our naval superiority: such a conciliation as borders 
pretty much on concession on their part.71 
 
To those who might complain that Britain was already at war with too many of the world’s 
nations to risk hostilities with another, The Times replied: ‘And what does that signify?  We are 
at war with the whole world’s master, and no wonder therefore if we are at war with the whole 
world.’72 
The British government did try to negotiate a solution to its disagreements with America rather 
than revert to war in the early years of the nineteenth century, at a time when Britain’s European 
trade was increasingly circumscribed by the Berlin and Milan decrees of 1806 and 1807. 
Canning argued in Cabinet, together with the Duke of Portland, against retaliation against neutral 
shipping which carried goods bound for or from France, in order not to antagonise the United 
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States. He sent George Rose, junior, as a special emissary to Washington to discuss reparations 
for the Chesapeake – Leopard affair of June 1807, in which the British naval commander had 
clearly been in the wrong.73 He even supported the repeal of the British Orders in Council, 
passed in 1807 and 1809 in response to the Berlin and Milan decrees, for the sake of improving 
relations with America as well as for relieving economic distress at home. The end of Jefferson’s 
presidency raised hopes in Britain of easier relations with the United States, and Canning 
discussed a draft agreement with the British minister in Washington, David Erskine, in 1809.74  
Erskine, however, ignored several of Canning’s conditions and qualifications, departing ‘widely 
not only from their Letter but from their Spirit’, as Canning put it to him, rejecting the agreement 
shortly before recalling him from his post.75 It is clear that the points at issue between Britain and 
America were all caused by Britain’s war against France, and that for this reason Britain was 
unwilling to concede much, if anything, to American demands. Canning objected strongly to the 
American Intercourse Bill put forward by the Talents Ministry in 1806 to appease American 
grievances. His comment to Erskine in January 1809 on the subject of the newly arrived Madison 
administration is telling: 
In this case, as in respect to the Subject of my other Dispatches, you will see that 
the Sincerity of the good Disposition professed by the Persons composing the New 
Administration, is the Point the most important in the View of the British 
Government. 
If such a Disposition really exists, all Difficulties will (as Mr. Galater [sic] has 
expressed himself) be easily smoothed away.  
If unfortunately this Hope should be disappointed, Great Britain has only to 
continue the System of Self Defence and Retaliation upon her Enemies to which 
she has been compelled to have Recourse, with the Consciousness of having 
eagerly seized the first Opportunity that appeared to be offered to her, of obtaining, 
through an amicable Arrangement, the Object for which that System was 
established.76 
 
Evidently, despite his efforts to avoid conflict, Canning’s view of what might constitute a ‘good 
Disposition’ in the new American government had much to do with its willingness to concede 
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points held to be essential to the British government in its heightening economic war with 
France. In the end, British official and conservative attitudes towards America during the war 
against revolutionary and Napoleonic France were chiefly determined by that conflict.77 The 
Anglo-American hostilities of 1812-15, however, generated substantial conservative commentary 
in their own right. 
 
IV The War of 1812 
Both before and after the Anglo-American War of 1812, British conservative analysis of its 
causes ignored the British contribution, unsurprisingly, except to suggest that Britain had been 
too generous in its concessions to America, and attributed responsibility instead to American 
francophilia and French machinations. The United States had borne all kinds of abuse of their 
maritime commerce from France without complaint, although it had taken grave offence at limits 
imposed by the British which had included special concessions in favour of America. It had 
helped France to maintain its own trade with French colonies at a time when Britain had 
prevented French ships from trading. It had seized every opportunity to take umbrage against 
Britain, even at accidents, such as the shooting of an American civilian by the crew of HMS 
Leander in 1806.78 In his Key to the Orders in Council (1812), written partly with an American 
readership in mind, Croker argued that Napoleon’s Milan decree of 1807 had been ‘entirely 
directed to America’ and ‘a menace to her’; but he criticized their government for repeatedly 
falling in with French propaganda regarding the legitimacy or otherwise of British and French 
economic blockades. He marvelled at its ‘almost miraculous deafness and blindness to the insults 
of France’, and he warned:  
There are now but two free nations on the face of the globe, Great Britain and 
America – let the latter beware how she raises her parricidal hand against the parent 
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country; her trade and liberty cannot long survive the downfall of British commerce 
and British freedom. If the citadel which now encloses and protects all that remains 
of European liberty be stormed, what shall defend the American union from the 
inroads of the despot?79 
 
Barrow and others at the Quarterly went so far as to express the conviction that ‘a secret 
understanding existed’ between Madison and Bonaparte, and they claimed that Madison 
displayed a ‘gross partiality for France’, dating back to the American War of Independence. 
Even more boldly, they stated unequivocally that  
this war of Mr. Madison is, to all intents and purposes, a French war, and not an 
American one: … he has plunged into it … for French interests; nay more, that he 
has plunged into it in conformity with repeated orders from France.80  
 
The Anti-Jacobin Review agreed with this diagnosis, describing Madison’s administration as 
‘these sottish blockheads, … the tools and agents of a foreign tyrant’.81 Canning lamented at 
length in the House of Commons America’s renunciation of neutrality in the European war in 
order to lend ‘her aid to crush those principles to which she owes her own existence, and to 
support the most desolating tyranny that ever afflicted the race of man. … I fear, that in the 
republic of America we look for the realization of our visions of republican virtue in vain’, he 
added. He predicted loss of character, loss of prosperity, military and naval losses, and even loss 
of liberty for the United States by its ‘heartless and selfish policy’ in taking the wrong side in this 
war.82  
Another Quarterly writer, however, while confirming the closeness of the Madison government 
to France, disputed the suggestion that Madison had been Bonaparte’s puppet, or that America 
was acting primarily in support of French objects rather than its own. This reviewer was 
convinced that Madison and Bonaparte had much in common, not least hatred of England. Much 
more important, however, was their shared thirst for conquest and a common desire to extend 
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their empires to their natural limits – in Madison’s case, from the Gulf of Mexico to the north 
coast of Canada. In other words, the War of 1812 was not a response to such irritants as the 
Orders in Council or British impressment of American sailors – ‘territorial reprisal for oceanic 
outrages’ – but rather it was ‘a war of conquest’.83 Canning, too, expressed suspicion that the 
desire to acquire Canada had been ‘the real motive’, the ‘grand and favourite design’, behind 
what he told the House of Commons had been an American ‘predetermination to war’.84 
The United States was also accused of attempting to destroy the British navy by seducing British 
sailors into committing treason by joining the American service, although the Anti-Jacobin 
Review defended the British impressment of American sailors as perfectly legitimate, since 
Britain only impressed men who had already deserted the British service for American 
shipping.85 By July 1813 the Quarterly Review estimated that the United States had ‘robbed’ 
Britain of between 40,000 and 60,000 seamen, and that the quality of sailors manning the smaller 
American navy was beginning to outweigh significantly that of sailors in the much larger British 
navy because of this practice.86 Since the Royal Navy was the ultimate guarantor of the rights of 
Britons, this American objective struck at ‘all that is dear to man’.87 
A further opinion expressed in the Quarterly was that American hostility towards Britain was not 
to be attributed primarily to French dictates, nor to such causes as naval concerns or territorial 
conquest, but rather, fundamentally, to the internal politics of the United States.88 This view 
returned to the distinction between the northern and southern states of America.  
It must be borne in mind that America is divided into two great parties, the federal 
party composed of the most respectable merchants and farmers of the northern 
states, and the anti-federal party, which embrace all those of the southern states, 




The northern states demonstrated ‘a firm and decided abhorrence of French principles and 
French alliance’, but Jefferson and Madison were both Virginians, and wished to secure southern 
power over the north within the Union. As the Anti-Jacobin Review put it, therefore, ‘It is, then, 
to preserve the power of the landholder to the south-ward, by the destruction of American 
commerce and navigation, that war has been declared against Great Britain’.90 
The Anti-Jacobin Review claimed repeatedly from 1806 onward that Britain had been too 
generous to the United States in relation to the neutral carrying trade, its policy looking ‘more 
like the patience of the ass, than the contempt of the lion’.91 This liberality may have emanated 
from ‘the imbecile theory and flimsy systems’ of the liberal Ministry of All the Talents under 
Grenville and Fox in 1806-7, but the more conservative governments of Portland, Perceval and 
Liverpool which succeeded it – during which time Canning served as Foreign Secretary in the 
Portland administration – were not immune from criticism in this regard.92 The British 
government that it would lose less by going to war against America than it would by continuing 
to make concessions.93 A major article in the Quarterly in March 1812, however, written by John 
Barrow with the help of Canning, Croker and others, contended that Britain ought to avoid war 
with America if at all possible, because such a war was likely to benefit only France. They did 
not admit any apprehension regarding America – the prospect of diverting troops and ships to 
Canada and the United States was sufficient reason to call for caution – but such an argument, 
made by such a group of eminent commentators on America, may imply a certain respect for the 
capability of the United States by 1812, mixed in with conservative conviction of British 
superiority and American jacobinism.94  
Neither stance, however, admitted any suggestion that Britain carried any responsibility for the 
conflict with America. ‘The orders in council were not the true cause of the war’, the Anti-
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Jacobin Review insisted; ‘– they were made use of by the American Government as a mere cloak 
or stalking horse to conceal their views, which in truth are aimed at the destruction of the British 
navy.’95 In any case, the repeal of the Orders in Council had been insufficient to forestall the 
outbreak of war, Canning argued, ‘for this plain reason that the American government was not to 
be satisfied. They had an itch for war with this country, and they were determined to have it’.96 
When British shipping had been to blame, as in the case of the dispute between HMS Leopard 
and the US frigate Chesapeake in 1807, Britain had been willing to make reparations, but 
America had immediately closed its harbours to all British shipping, an over-reaction which 
Britain required to have lifted before it would make reparations. While Britain’s dealings with 
the American government were marked, Croker wrote, by ‘a spirit of frankness and candour’, it 
could not be said that the American Government had accepted British concessions ‘with either 
dignity or grace’.97 The conservatives defended Britain’s absolute right to uphold traditional 
maritime regulations, which had been accepted by all other nations in the past, for the sake of its 
naval power and dominance.98 It was feared that repealing the Orders in Council would lead to 
the demise of British trade, shipping interest and manufacturing, in favour of France and 
America which, between them, ‘would divide the trade of the globe’.99  
Moreover, insults from a new state to a powerful, established one could not be tolerated. The 
Anti-Jacobin Review expostulated: 
there never was, from the origin of civil society, to the present time, a nation, 
insignificant in the scale of power, in the infancy almost of civilization, and with a 
circumscribed revenue, arising from sources over which she had not absolute 
controul, publicly discussing, in her legislative bodies, not only the propriety and 
necessity of war with a friendly state, but the means of carrying it on, and the 
objects to which it should be directed! This is a novel spectacle in the civilized 




Canning explained to his electors in Liverpool at the start of the conflict ‘that to seek peace 
through humiliation is a course neither of honour nor of advantage’. Such aggression was proof 
of profound American hostility to Britain, and could only properly be met by greater force. The 
Americans were beginning to think themselves far more powerful than they were and, worse, 
that Britain was afraid of them or unable to counter their threat.101 ‘There is, then, we repeat, but 
one mode of reply to such language’, agreed the Anti-Jacobin Review. Yet the same periodical 
declared later in the war: ‘Regardless of the present imbecility of the infant nation, we should 
crush it, ere manhood has endued it with power to make us feel the effects of its inveterate 
hatred’.102 Despite its confident language, the implication again is detectible that the United 
States was not to be considered without a certain respect; it might not always remain ‘imbecile’ 
as it grew out of infancy, and Britain must enforce its own superiority while it could. As 
Bickham points out, it was important to the British government and its supporters that America 
should remain a client rather than a rival.103 
Such concern was generally subordinate to the general puffing of British confidence in American 
weakness and British strength, however. From early on in the crisis, the Anti-Jacobin Review 
voiced the firm belief that American commerce would suffer from a conflict against Britain, 
while British trade would remain largely unaffected: for instance, America could not do much to 
damage Britain by withdrawing its cotton, since (it airily suggested) the British West Indies 
could resume cotton production in place of sugar within a year. It was under no anxiety that the 
United States would be capable of taking the British West Indies; nor did it think that they could 
prevent Britain from continuing to fish off Newfoundland, another longstanding irritant. It was 
confident that the Royal Navy was well able to protect British merchant shipping, but expressed 
colourful contempt for the American navy (‘consisting of two or three frigates and half a dozen 
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sloops and brigs’) and army. Canada was not seriously endangered, since the regular American 
army was too small, and its militia was not trained for offensive operations.104 The Quarterly’s 
reviewers agreed. The American army was ‘yet a project on paper’ and so it was unlikely to 
accomplish the conquest of Canada; its ‘warlike navy’ did not yet ‘appear to be quite competent 
to such an achievement’ as the capture of the British West Indies; and its economy would suffer 
far more from hostilities than its trade would benefit.105 Canning suggested that it was premature 
to expect such a new nation to survive a major conflict: ‘I would not have asked her to risk her 
tender and unconfirmed existence in a war’.106  
Post-war analyses by conservative commentators concentrated on abusing American conduct 
during the conflict, in contrast to their praise for the bravery and merit of the British troops 
involved. The Quarterly Review accused the American troops of barbarity towards native 
Americans fighting on the British side and towards Canadian civilians, and of cowardice in the 
face of British military resistance, while the Anti-Jacobin Review complained of their ill-
treatment of British prisoners of war.107 The United States had, however, in British conservative 
opinion, gained little by the war and, indeed, had lost substantially by it, not least nearly fifty 
thousand men killed, wounded or taken prisoner. They claimed that America had gained none of 
the objects for which it had gone to war, while British objects (the protection of British colonies 
and the maintenance of maritime rights) were ‘completely secured’, despite the flaws of the 
British military and naval command. The United States was also suffering economic depression 
as a direct result of the conflict.108 More abstractly, Canning asserted that the ‘hard features of 
transatlantic democracy’ had debased the reputation of republics and republican virtue.109 The 
Quarterly, somewhat exaggerating the closeness of the Anglo-American diplomatic relationship 
before the crisis, advised rather bitterly that, after the war, Britain must learn to live in mistrust 
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of the United States: ‘to live with one who has been an unprovoked enemy as if he had never 
ceased to be a dear friend, would indeed be a piece of foolishness which no warmth of blood 
could excuse’. 110  
The Anti-Jacobin Review agreed that British ministers must be firm over the terms and even the 
timing of this peace treaty, ensuring that the ban on American trade with the British West Indies 
was reinforced, and that British maritime rights must not be conceded in any detail. ‘The tone of 
firmness, of decision, of dictation, on our part, is the only one suitable to our own dignity, and to 
the relative circumstances and situation of the two countries.’111 Moreover, the danger to Canada 
had been reinforced, and writers commenting on the war some years after its end reflected upon 
this, discussing how Canada might be better protected against American invasion in the future or 
against the baleful effects of too great an influx into Canada of American emigrants. Once more, 
the note of fear of an increasingly powerful and not necessarily benign United States was 
sounded, even if it was almost entirely dominated by a symphony of confidence in superior 
British power and influence.112 In 1818, the Quarterly Review warned: 
There is a nation without the limits of Europe, to whom, for the sake of our kindred 
race and common language, we would gladly wish prosperity; but whose hope of 
elevation is built on our expected fall, and who even now do not affect to conceal 
the bitterness of their hatred towards the land of their progenitors. Already we hear 
the Americans boasting that the whole continent must be their own, that the 
Atlantic and the Pacific are alike to wash their empire, and that it depends on their 
charity what share in either ocean they may allow to our vessels.113 
 
V American economic development 
British conservatives, however, doubted the American claim to economic greatness as yet. 
Arthur Young disputed Paine’s argument that it was wealthier and cheaper to govern as a direct 
result of its republican government. Paine had said that the American poor were better able to 
pay taxes than those in England: Young returned that it was far more expensive to gather taxes 
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from the poor in the wilds of the American outback than the tax could be worth, while the 
circulation of money was a great deal more rapid in Britain. Indeed, he argued, the amount of tax 
paid was less relevant than how much a country’s people had left in their own pockets after 
paying tax, and on this estimate, Englishmen were a great deal better off than Americans. In any 
case, he pointed out, picking at an old British sore point, 
No comparison can be drawn justly, between a new country that did not form itself 
and an old one that did, and now pays the expence of forming that new one. Let the 
American account be charged with the expence of the war of 1756, or one hundred 
millions, and then compare taxation.114 
 
If there were few really indigent poor in America, Young emphasized, this was not because the 
United States was not saddled with a monarchy, but rather because of its vast expanse of fertile 
land and thinly scattered population, which made it ‘idle to cite the example of America’ since 
its economy was therefore so unlike any in Europe.115 In fact, ‘unfortunately for [Paine’s] 
argument, there are poor, and even slaves, in America’, while the current state of republican 
France hardly supported Paine’s argument for the effect of representative government on the 
welfare of the poor.116  
The Anti-Jacobin Review was considerably more disparaging about American economic 
achievements or potential, and it based this opinion in part on a sourer view of American 
resources than Young’s. It asserted that the quality of American land was poor and the climate 
difficult, relying on Richard Parkinson’s Tour in America in 1798, 1799, and 1800 (1805), which 
detailed Parkinson’s disappointment with his attempts to farm in Virginia and Maryland. Poor 
land meant that commerce, rather than agriculture, must be the staple of the American economy. 
In turn, trade would require a powerful navy to defend merchant shipping; and, since only 
Britain possessed such a navy, and the greatest proportion of American trade was carried on with 
Britain, the economy of the United States was to some extent in Britain’s power. Moreover, 
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nothing was yet made in the United States that Britain did not already make, transport, and sell in 
America more cheaply than its own domestic products, partly because of the very high taxation 
levied in America.117 Both the Anti-Jacobin Review and the Quarterly Review took a dim view of 
American commercial integrity. In the Quarterly, it was argued that the boasted freedom enjoyed 
by American merchants was ‘a freedom from the wholesome laws of honest dealing’ and their 
behaviour was contrasted with the ‘public liberality, private munificence, fair dealing, and 
urbanity of manners’ exhibited by the British ‘and, generally speaking’, the European 
merchant.118  Furthermore, in John Barrow’s opinion, the United States had no principal towns 
worth describing or discussing – to do so ‘would contribute neither to the information nor 
amusement of our readers’ – and in 1800 the Anti-Jacobin Review ridiculed the imminent move 
of the seat of federal government from Philadephia to ‘a wood in Maryland, called the city of 
Washington’, predicting that, ‘if any thing would hasten the down-fall of this tottering fabric of a 
government, it certainly would be the ridiculous removal in question’.119 
Despite these withering assessments of American economic progress, hints of British 
conservative apprehension that American commerce was growing significantly also emerged, 
particularly in the Quarterly Review. Some of this concern may be explained by rising tension in 
the years leading up to the War of 1812, but, even in 1823, an article to which Barrow 
contributed warned that America was rapidly taking over the carrying trade from Britain, and 
expressed the fear that Canada and Britain’s other American colonies in particular would suffer 
by this development.120 Very occasionally, admiration for American economic practice crept in, 
such as the Anti-Jacobin Review’s applause for American regulation of sales in urban markets, 
which it even recommended that Britain would do well to imitate.121 
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VI American society: slavery, character, religion and intellectual life 
George Canning was a convinced abolitionist – ‘no man was more anxious than himself to see 
this detestable traffic completely destroyed’ – and he complained that the United States was an 
obstacle to the abolition of the international slave trade; but his objection was that the United 
States would not allow Britain to retain the sole right to stop and search international shipping 
suspected of carrying slaves. He was concerned that to agree to reciprocal rights of stop and 
search would be to allow American privateers the opportunity of creating ‘an intolerable 
annoyance to our whole trade’. (He ignored the possibility that British privateers might 
perpetrate a similar mischief on American shipping). This anxiety was perhaps understandable in 
the context of the crisis leading up to the War of 1812. Later, as Foreign Secretary in the 1820s, 
he pressed the United States to agree to a bilateral convention suppressing the slave trade which 
was signed in March 1824, but it never came into force because of difficulties created over 
Canning’s insistence on this very point.122  
The reviews were also critical of the retention of slavery in America, though only after Britain 
had abolished its own slave trade, and they did not devote much space to discussing the subject. 
It is difficult to escape the perhaps uncharitable thought that they often seized on the issue rather 
because they wished to deploy any powerful argument they could to denigrate the United States, 
than because they were committed abolitionists, although of course there were exceptions.123 
They often listed it simply as one of a series of flaws in American society and government; and 
they rejected any imputation of blame to Britain for the introduction of the institution – ‘the 
blame of it’, according to the Anti-Jacobin Review, ‘ought to lie at the door, not of the Mother 
Country, but of the Colonial Legislatures themselves, who alone encouraged the trade’.124 
Slavery, the Quarterly stated in 1809, hardened the hearts and corrupted the morals of the people 
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of the southern states, and rendered society hostile to improvement. While giving the United 
States credit for banning the importation of slaves from 1808, the Anti-Jacobin Review noted that 
as many as possible had been imported into the south before the turn of that year, and it criticized 
the restrictions upon slaves still held in the country, and the inhumanity with which they were 
often treated. John Barrow agreed that the brutal treatment of black slaves in the United States 
‘proved this new continent to be some centuries behind in civilisation’, ignoring cruelty to slaves 
still held on British West Indian plantations. The northern states were not given much credit for 
outlawing slavery: there, noted the Anti-Jacobin Review rather primly, ‘they only avoid, or treat 
the blacks, as Brahmins do Parias [sic] in the east, and we can hardly say which is the worst’.125 
Moreover, conservative complaints about the treatment of black slaves was combined with 
criticism of the practice of ‘white slavery’, or indentured servitude, and the difficulty of 
redeeming oneself from its bonds in ‘this freedom-breathing country’.126  
American behaviour towards native Americans tended to be minimized, and it was not a subject 
considered at any length by these conservative commentators. One review published after the 
War of 1812, whose writer wished to stress that Britain ought to be the arbiter of the boundaries 
between American, Canadian and native American territories, acknowledged the ‘injuries and 
persecutions sustained by the Indians from the practised frauds, and systematic encroachments of 
the Americans’. Otherwise, the struggle to push native Americans further westward was 
dismissed as ‘a petty Indian war’ and a ‘trifling exception’ to the peace and calm obtainable by a 
state with the great expanse of land at the disposal of the United States.127  
The conservative reviews had little positive to say about American society more generally. ‘The 
national character of America has nothing attractive, nothing commanding, nothing great, 
belonging to it’, declared the Anti-Jacobin Review in March 1814. The Quarterly Review of 
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January that year had also expanded upon the alleged vulgarity and coarseness of American 
society. It might be suggested that these judgements were coloured by the fact that the War of 
1812-15 had been ongoing for nearly two years when they were written; but loyalist literature of 
the 1790s, including Gifford’s life of Paine, had also depicted the inhabitants of the United States 
as ‘all the refuse of the nations, the issues and sweepings of the prisons, the nuisance of society, 
and the scum of kingdoms’, and they had cited the treatment of American Loyalists during the 
Revolution and the slowness of Americans to pay their debts to British merchants as indicative 
of American barbarity, greed and dishonesty.128 The Quarterly Review  pointed out that the 
American character ought to be distinctive, since they were neither an old people nor in strict 
terms a new race, bur rather ‘a new people made of old materials’. The distinction the 
conservative reviews found, however, was entirely negative and consisted of brutality, arrogance 
and lack of refinement. Passages on the squalor, drunkenness, rudeness and popularity of tobacco 
found by dissatisfied travellers in America received lengthy quotations in reviews of their books. 
One writer pondered whether the wildness of their surroundings had somehow entered into the 
character and even the physiognomy of Americans. The Anti-Jacobin Review admitted that its 
was not a blanket condemnation of all Americans, yet it was adamant that the exceptions were 
few and inadequate to the task of improving the rottenness of the majority.129  
Similarly, conservative reviewers were highly critical of the inattention to religion they claimed 
was rife in the United States (even to the point of doing without baptismal and burial services in 
the southern states, it was said).130 This irreligion was largely blamed on the republican 
constitution of the United States, which preferred to ‘see piety shocked and christianity reviled, 
than its fantastical notions of religious and civil liberty exposed or counteracted’. The division of 
church and state was censured, because it removed religion from the constitutional code, an act 
 35 
which was embodied in the election of Thomas Jefferson as third president, whom the 
conservative reviews assumed to be an atheist. ‘We have no hesitation in advancing this 
proposition as a maxim, THAT NO STATE WHICH HAS NOT RELIGION FOR ITS BASIS, 
EITHER CAN STAND, OR OUGHT TO STAND’, the Anti-Jacobin Review stated, and it pointed 
out the irony of a nation whose first British settlers arrived with high Christian motivation having 
descended to be governed by men who professed ‘a liberal indifference whether there be any 
religion in the country or none’.131 
Nor were they pleased by the religion which they did find – as the Quarterly put it, there was 
‘scarcely any medium in America between over-godliness and a brutal irreligion’.132 Where 
religion was practised, it was manifested in a multiplicity of denominations (termed ‘illegitimate 
sects’  by the Quarterly Review). The episcopal church was weak and itself too ‘republican’ in its 
form, in its permission of discussion of forms and doctrines, and in its anxiety not to offend 
political republicans.133 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine pointed out that the lack of an 
established church meant that there was no obligation to provide religious instruction. There 
were therefore too few religious teachers, and many of them were inadequately educated, ‘being 
fanatics and pretenders to immediate inspiration’.134 Fanaticism, particularly in the form of 
Methodism, was ‘a growing evil’, and the conservative reviews took care to reprint lengthy 
descriptions of Methodist meetings where all kinds of outlandish behaviour took place.135   
The American intellect was not inferior, Blackwood’s allowed; Americans were the equal of any 
people in respect of ‘practical cleverness and business’, as their ingenuity in mechanics, 
commerce and law showed. The American intellect was not, however, applied to traditional 
scholarly pursuits, in the view of all three reviews. It was somewhat grudgingly agreed that the 
works of Charles Brocken Brown and Washington Irving should be better known, and that some 
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very good books on religion, history and criticism had emerged from the United States; but it 
was argued that none of these was of the highest order or expected to achieve lasting honour, 
with the possible exception of the writings of the pre-Revolution preacher and theologian 
Jonathan Edwards.136 The general British conservative assessment of American literature and 
learning was deeply disparaging: they were ‘the scorn of Europe’, according to the Quarterly. ‘If 
the whole stock of their literature were set on fire tomorrow, no scholar would feel the loss’, 
declared Blackwood’s.137 A particularly rude verdict on an American pamphlet on European 
economic warfare was published by the Anti-Jacobin Review in 1807: 
This is the wretched effusion of some whining Yankee, written in a kind of mongrel 
English, intelligible, for aught we know, on the banks of the Delaware, but scarcely 
so on the banks of the Thames! It is written in the same spirit as the subject of the 
preceding article, but without the same ability. In short, it is equally destitute of 
argument and of sense, and is one of the most contemptible productions that we 
have had the mortification to read for some time.138 
 
Similar examples could be multiplied. The most charitable reviews noted patronisingly that 
American culture was yet too young to have produced any really profound or seminal works of 
art or literature.139 The least sympathetic criticized American literature for treating the English 
language barbarously, for exaggerating the facts, and for emerging from the press with 
monotonously uniform thinking.140 Aside from the youth of America’s development, other 
causes suggested for the inadequacy of its literary productions were the poor quality of its 
schools and libraries. These had been overlooked while the new polity was established, which 
was perhaps excusable, but it was no longer acceptable that they should be neglected in favour of 
commercial priorities.141 Nor was it only the arts which were ignored. The United States had 
been surprisingly slow to develop scientific achievements, other than Benjamin Franklin’s – and 
the foundation of his knowledge, it was claimed, had been laid in London, not America. The 
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Quarterly Review was very critical of the Jefferson administration for not having sufficiently 
equipped the Lewis and Clarke expedition from the Missouri to the Pacific coast (1804-6) so that 
it could bring back a much fuller record of data.142  
 
VII The United States of America for emigrants: ‘this is the real world, and no poetical 
Arcadia’ 
The basis for a significant volume of writing on the United States in the reviews was works of 
travel writing. British conservatives reviewed works directed at potential British emigrants to the 
United States favourably or unfavourably depending on whether they recommended it as a 
destination;  predictably, they favoured those works which disparaged its reputation as a ‘Land 
of Promise’. The reviews lost no opportunity to traduce British radicals who emigrated to the 
United States and criticized Britain from afar.143 Conservatives felt a responsibility to disabuse 
those who might be taken in by radical claims for the new republic, and to explain to potential 
emigrants that they were being disloyal to Britain in departing, as well as naïve.144 (If Britons 
must emigrate, the reviews offered Canada as a far superior destination.)145  Reviewers therefore 
drew happily and at length upon the writings of emigrants and travellers who claimed to have 
learned the true nature of life in America by hard experience.  
The land was barren, the climate was difficult, and emigrants were likely to be ruined.146 
American territory became a byword for wildness and savagery in conservative writing: when 
Arthur Young wanted to convey the remoteness of the lands around Limoge in France, he called 
it ‘an American scene; wild enough for the tomahawk of the savage’, and when he wanted to 
communicate the disorder of the National Convention, he reported Marat as having said that 
even an American would have thought it ‘an assembly of madmen and furies’.147 Servants, and 
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‘the lower classes of people’ generally, were insolent, because of notions of their own liberty and 
equality.148 Conditions for travellers were poor, with bad roads and crowded, dirty inns.149 
American towns were filthy, ‘bespeak[ing] a corruption of mind and heart which must extort our 
reprobation’.150 Readers were warned of unscrupulous agents and writers who had an interest in 
luring emigrants, and of the dangers posed by indentured servitude. The United States was 
accused of sending ‘emissaries’ to ‘lure the peasantry from their rustic labours’ to work in 
America.151  
In a vituperative review of Morris Birkbeck’s controversial and optimistic Notes on a Journey in 
America, the Anti-Jacobin Review emphasized the passages where he had admitted flaws in his 
adopted country, and summed up:  
So that this, after all, is the real world, and no poetical Arcadia after all. … Of the 
chances of success in life by emigration, we shall say nothing … the old world 
must vomit its idle population into the new …. The sum total of Mr. Birkbeck’s 
experience is, that in the wilds of Illinois, a backwoods’ man and his family, with a 
sufficient sum to begin the world, may vegetate coarsely, solitarily, and sullenly.152  
 
John Barrow, in the Quarterly, meanwhile, cast aspersions on Birkbeck’s character, and similarly 
managed to spend all of his twenty-five pages on anything Birkbeck had found less than perfect 
in realising his American dream, concluding that, ‘In spite … of his forced attempt to make the 
best of America, every now and then the truth peeps out in some sarcastic remark on the 
character or the condition of the people’.153  
 
VIII Conclusion 
Conservative reviewers did not always paint in unremitting shades of black when conveying 
their views of the United States of America during these decades. They did admit from time to 
time that there were numbers of admirable people in America, despite their strictures on 
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American politics and society. In particular, they often wished to draw a distinction between a 
‘respectable minority’ and the ‘democratical majority, composed of Frenchified natives and 
renegado foreigners’, and, although the Republican presidents Thomas Jefferson and  James 
Madison were depicted as untrustworthy characters, their political rivals George Washington and 
John Adams were often portrayed as statesmen who had seen the flaws in the American 
constitution but who had been overruled.154 
These conservative commentators, then, whether Westminster politicians or journalists, inserted 
into the long-term British view of the United States a potent combination of resentment and 
contempt, laced with a certain element of unease. The years between 1791 and 1820 were 
dominated by the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, and America was viewed 
principally through that lens and through the prism of British domestic politics and the struggle 
against the emerging force of radicalism. Because the United States could be portrayed by 
reformers as an ideal republican government with some sympathy for France in the long 
European war, it was difficult for British conservatives to view it with anything but suspicion, 
which easily descended into bile. But the blithe conviction of conservatives writing and speaking 
before the 1790s, that the new American republic was doomed to failure and inadequacy, was 
now spiked with periodic shots of apprehension that in fact the United States might prove a more 
difficult factor in various spheres for British politicians than they had hitherto imagined. 
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